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Abstract
Until the 1990s, it was no secret that China possessed one of the most laggard
and technologically backward defence industries in the world. But Deng
Xiaoping’s orchestrated plans of channelling private funds into defence R&D
provided the required impetus for the growth of the aviation industry in China.
After nearly three decades of investment, reorganisation, and acquisition
of broad foreign technology, China’s aviation sector is now well on its way
to making China one of the top two or three global air and space powers by
the 2020s.
In view of the changing geo-strategic scenario, increased asymmetry in terms
of air power of China vis-a-vis India, it is an imperative to examine the
implications of the burgeoning Chinese air power capability for Indian Air
Force in the medium- as well as the long-term. This examination delves into
a reality check on the Chinese aviation industry through an Indian prism
and the likely air power capabilities which China likely to acquire through
its proactive aviation industries. The Indian government is aware of this fact
and new incentives have already been introduced to rejuvenate Indian aviation
industry; however, the present incentives of ‘Make in India’ and strategic
partnership need to be recapitulated further.
Introduction
China has emerged as a major regional power with clear aspirations to be a
global power soon. Comprehensive military modernisation programmes
supplemented with sustained economic, scientific and technological
developments have substantially elevated China’s international profile. Post-
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independence, the Chinese had set up a defence infrastructure modelled on the
lines of the Soviet Union but with Chinese characteristics. Therefore, the arms
industries over the years have been able to produce a wide range of conventional
weapon systems like tanks, small arms, armoured vehicles, artillery, missiles,
bombers, fighters and naval vessels, which though obsolete when compared
with the West, were nevertheless, manufactured indigenously.
Until the 1990s, it was no secret that China possessed one of the most laggard
and technologically backward defence industries in the world. Most indigenously
developed weapon systems were of inferior quality and trailing way behind the
west by at least a decade and a half, if not more. However, with Deng’s
orchestrated plans of channelling private funds into defence R&D, provided the
required impetus for the growth of the Aviation Industry in China. After nearly
three decades of investment, reorganisation, and acquisition of broad foreign
technology, China’s aviation sector is now well on its way to making China one
of the top two or three global air and space powers by the 2020s. China is now
producing two fifth-generation fighters and the Chinese-made, carrier-based,
e2 fighter is undergoing trials. These fighters are equipped with Chinese-made
world class precision air-to-air and ground attack weapons. China employs more
than 1,20,000 personnel in aviation related R&D, making it the largest in the
world.
Hence, Chinese aviation industry, which was earlier impaired by the
unwillingness of the conservative leaders to implement path-breaking reforms,
has been reversed in this millennium and the industry is fast consolidating to be
able to rub shoulders with the top ranks in the global aviation sector.1 It has
been observed that there has been a definite shift in the guiding principle driving
the aviation industry, from earlier obsession for quantity to now quality, from
being a technology imitator to eventually becoming an enabler, with a major
thrust on the sector to transcend and match up to the global standards, if not by
2020 then at least by 2030.
However, China’s emergence as a military superpower against the backdrop
of its propensity for military conflict over contentious issues raises strategic
uncertainties and concerns about China’s future military directions. It’s truism
that the twenty-first century future, of not just Asia, but the entire world, will be
significantly determined by the relationship between the globe’s two fastest
growing economies, China and India. As most observers know, there have for
long been kinks in the political-military relationship between the two countries.
India, despite being amongst the top ten defence spenders in the world, continues
to procure over 70 percent of its equipment needs from abroad. As a result,
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India is unable to extract the maximum benefit for its economy from the
expansion cycle driven by the modernisation plan of its aviation industry. India
must rapidly shift focus from acquiring platforms to developing capabilities,
absorb R&D as an integral part of the system. The aviation industry in India
needs to strategize by becoming a part of the global supply chain which can, not
only invigorate the aviation industry, but also bring along with it better
management and financial practices, improve efficiency and produce better
quality products for the end user.
The Puzzle, Assumption, Rationale
The dwindling strength of fighters in the Indian Air Force (IAF) due to
delayed and inadequate acquisitions, over-reliance on imports and the slow
growth of indigenous Indian aviation industry, in contrast with rapid strides by
the aviation industries of China, has resulted in a greater asymmetry in terms of
air power capability between the two countries and imposes a greater threat to
IAF in case of any future conflict.
Comparison of the force levels as they exist today and the extended sphere
of influence that China and India will acquire through planned inductions and
production capabilities of their aviation industries in the future, IAF will not be
able to match Chinese air power capabilities by 2030.
With recent changes in the geo-political scenario in the Indian sub-continent,
Sino-Indian relationship is facing new challenges in the form of ‘Doklam’ and
rising border issues of transgression in Ladakh as well as in Arunachal sector.
In view of this changing scenario, increased asymmetry in terms of airpower
(of China with respect to India, which has been acquired by virtue of its thriving
Chinese aviation industry in comparison to the slow and weak Indian aviation
industry) needs to be updated to examine the threat it poses to IAF in the medium
as well as the long terms. This examination entails a reality check on Chinese
aviation industry through an Indian prism and the likely airpower capabilities
which China is going to acquire through these aviation industries. The Indian
government is already aware of this fact and new incentives have already been
introduced to rejuvenate Indian Aviation Industry; the present incentives of ‘Make
in India’ and strategic partnership need to be recapitulated to provoke qualitative
as well as quantitative analysis of air power capabilities of both countries in a
present day scenario and thus draw the future with respect to future plans.
The article attempts to enquire upon the modernisation of aviation industries
of China in terms of recent developments with prime focus on the military aircraft
in general and fighter aircraft in particular. On similar lines, Indian aviation
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industry is analysed in terms of ongoing fighter air craft projects as well as peek
into the future after implementation of new incentives by the current Indian
government to predict likely airpower capabilities between the two countries
by 2030.
China’s Aviation Industry: Evolution and Revolution
China has recognised the strategic reality that in its move upwards to military
superpower status, it should contend not only with the US but also with many
competing regional powers for the same power status and the main complicating
factors in this are its territorial disputes with them, which could hinder China’s
military rise. It has also realised that such regional powers could be induced to
gravitate towards the United States if China continues to exploit border disputes
as strategic pressure points. For the last two decades, China has deeply studied
the military developments that are taking place across the world, with a primary
focus on the United States. Seminal moments like the co-ordination of the US
air campaign during operation “Desert Storm” were wake-up calls for Beijing
to modernise its military. At the same time, the increasingly global lines of
communication that sustain the Chinese economy concurrently began to extend
beyond the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s ability to project force. As China
moved into the twenty-first century, its military was intent upon following and
integrating the teachings of the western military powers. From developing the
JF-17 fighter jet, which is equipped with the Russian engine, to bringing the
new J-10 fighter on line equipped with a domestic engine, China has already
refined its domestic military aviation industry. The ability to design and produce
indigenously, two fighter aircrafts possibly equivalent to the early F-SC is
noteworthy.2
Emergence as an economic superpower was not a challenging task for China
but it faced substantial number of challenges in its pursuit towards achieving
the same status in the field of aviation. In order to prove its hegemony in the
sub-continent, supremacy in terms of ‘Air Power’ was the first priority for China.
China’s aviation industry was plagued by problems of inefficiency, redundant
leadership, and overlapping organizational and bureaucratic structures. However,
with China’s strong economy and prioritized military development, such
problems were eradicated in due course of time. With the inception of reforms
and opening-up of PLA modernisation plans, problems in China’s outdated
aviation industry began to surface, prompting the leadership of People’s Republic
of China (PRC) to reinitiate a series of reforms. In May 2008, China established
the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd. (COMAC), and in November
2008, China merged China Aviation Industry Corporation I (AVIC I) and China
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Aviation Industry Corporation II (AVIC II) to found the China Aviation Industry
Corporation (AVIC). This overhaul of the aviation sector was an indication that
the pace of development and reform in China’s aviation industry is picking up.
Therefore, China’s determination and injection of resources into the industry
should not be underestimated by the outside world.
In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the environment changed to China’s
advantage. A desperately cash-deficient Russia offered to sell modern aircraft,
weapons and high-tech equipment to China whose booming economy could
provide ready dollars. Many jobless scientists, experts and technicians from the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were also available for hire. Israel
transferred designs and production technology to manufacture the Lavi jet fighter
in the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Company and thus began development of the
J-103. The JF-17 was also being developed in collaboration with Pakistan as a
result of these steps. Chinese aviation made good progress in all fields except
aero-engines and fire control radars. These shortcomings are being addressed
and China is reported to be investing in aero-engine R&D to cover this technology
gap. China has transformed itself from a country that imports the assembly line
of fourth generation fighters to a country that can now export the assembly line
of fifth generation fighters.
China’s Transformation: Imitator to Creator
China’s efforts to acquire, produce, and develop fighter aircraft and related
technology gained sufficient momentum by the early 1990s. China’s quest to
develop advanced fighter aircraft which required the most sophisticated level
of aerospace technology and presented unique design and fabrication challenges
for its military aviation industry was addressed through a series of organizational
reforms. Significant advances made in the areas of material science, avionics
and power engines from the defence arena have crossed over to the production
of civilian aircraft. Over the years, China had been using ‘Russians’ as a quick
fix solution during crisis and as a panacea for People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF)’s depleting stock of sophisticated aircraft. In the early years of
transition, there was technology flow from the west through the ‘Peace Pearl’
programme, as well as notable assistance from Israel and Italy. The Israel
Aerospace Industry (IAI) was instrumental in providing significant exposure to
China in the realm of high end technology through the 1980s and 1990s, which
created concern in the American establishment. As a result, Israel was coerced
into abandoning the sale of the Phalcon AWACS to China in 2000.
China’s growing insecurity because of an overt dependence on the West for
high end technology was reaffirmed by its belief, when it declared that there
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was no substitute for self- reliance. Therefore, China had to quickly transmute
from walking on four legs to standing on one’s own two feet. Hence, it was left
with no choice other than to develop a robust R&D infrastructure to counter its
seasonal isolations from the West, which had been displaying a systematic ‘on
and off’ strategy, with some regularity, particularly when it came to the business
of providing assistance in high end technology to China. As a result, China
decided to strengthen its R&D base by churning out large numbers of graduates
and engineers in the mid-1990s and providing them incentives to travel overseas
for higher education. The intention was to utilise the qualified human resource
which could later be re-injected into the system to augment the capability of
some of the strategic industries and help to build a strong R&D base for china.
China’s growing domestic capability has made rapid advances since the 1990s
when China was mostly producing copies of obsolete Soviet era air craft.
Gaps in technological capabilities were filled by building alliances with
foreign components and ‘parts’ manufacturers who are also suppliers or partners
of Boeing and Airbus. Also, China has been able to entice foreign competitors
to voluntarily transfer knowhow, using its huge domestic market as leverage.
The practice of outsourcing has also worked to the advantage of Chinese aircraft
makers. Indeed, the proliferation of foreign component and part suppliers allow
Chinese aircraft makers to easily source what they are unable to produce.
Presently, China’s aviation industry is producing two indigenous fourth
generation fighters, the J-10 and J-11. China’s is the only country in the world
who is pursuing two most prominent fifth generation stealth fighter projects,
which are J-20 and J-31. Not much is available about the performance of J-20
and J-31, but how advanced they are, as compared to the western and Russian
stealth fighters is yet to be seen in times to come.
Fifth Generation Fighters
The mantle of fifth, or even sixth, generation multirole combat aircraft
(MRCA) development has unquestionably moved east, with no less than five
Asian countries involved in indigenous future MRCA projects, and the leader
of the field is China. With a $ 132 billion defence budget, an increase of 12.2
percent over the previous year, China is forging ahead with the development of
a range of advanced MRCA for PLAAF. These include:
(a) J–20: Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) J-20, a fifth generation
MRCA flew its maiden flight in 2011. This large twin-engine, twin-fin,
canard/delta-wing aircraft, has internal weapons bays capable of housing
air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons plus an additional single missile
bay in each engine intake trunk; to date, six prototypes, powered by
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Russian AL-31F afterburning turbofans have been flown while
production of the J-20 may commence in 20174. China was initially
projected to have fifth generation aircraft by 2020. PLAAF Deputy
Commander Gen He Weirong stated that this fighter will enter service
between 2017 and 2019.5 He also said that the planes in development
will match or exceed the capability of similar jets in existence today.
Just before Gen He’s statement, Chinese internet sources stated a
prototype of the fifth-generation fighter that started flying in 2010,
albeit with a version of the 12/13 ton thrust WS 10A turbo fan in lieu of
the ‘not yet ready’ 15 ton thrust engine.
It was also noted that China could acquire up to 300 of these fighters,
which will have the “4 S” capabilities: stealth, super cruise, super
manoeuvrability and short take-off. Both the Shenyang Aircraft Company
601 Aero Design Institute and the Chengdu Aircraft Company 611 Aero
Design Institute were then allotted work in the “203” Programme. Both
are thought to have been working on heavy twin engine stealthy and
highly manoeuvrable designs to compete with the US and Russian fifth
generation fighters. Chengdu has usually been associated with a twin-
engine canard delta design. China is expected to have a handful of fifth
generation fighters in service by 2020.6 The general design concept of
the J-XX is that of a fifth-generation fighter.
(b) J–31: As reported by the Chinese state media, China has tested the
latest version of its fifth generation stealth fighter in an attempt to end
the West’s monopoly on the world’s most advanced warplanes. These
tests come as the nation flexes its military muscles, sending its sole
aircraft carrier the Liaoning into the western Pacific to lead drills there
for the first time. The newest version of the J-31- now renamed the
FC-31 Gyrfalcon took to the air for the first time on 27 Dec 2016. The
so-called “fifth generation” twin-engine fighter is China’s answer to
the US F-35, the world’s most technically advanced fighter. The new
FC-31 has “better stealth capabilities, improved electronic equipment
and larger payload capacity” than the previous version which debuted
in October 2012, according to aviation expert Wu Peixin. Changes
were made to the airframe, wings and vertical tails which make it
leaner, lighter and more manoeuvrable. The fighter is manufactured by
Shenyang Aircraft Corp, a subsidiary of the AVIC. When completed the
FC-31 will become the country’s second fifth generation fighter after
the J-20, which was put on its first public performance at the Zhuhai Air
Show in November 2016.7
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There is also a possibility that China could have a programme for other fifth
generation fighters, perhaps to include a medium weight fighter to complement
its reported heavyweight fighter programme. Nonetheless, as the capabilities of
China’s aviation industry begin to approach those of the rest of the world, the
latecomer’s advantage will no longer be obtained. In the absence of an indigenous
combat aircraft programme, Israel is unlikely to be able to provide China with
state-of-the-art aviation technologies outside of such key sub-systems as avionics.
Thus, further improvements in the capabilities of China’s aviation industry will
increasingly depend on its indigenous capacity for technological innovation.
From 1990 through 2010, specific to the PLAAF, the implications of a growing
fleet of fourth generation fighter aircraft hold two potential meanings. For the
strategic intentions of China, they represent a natural replacement for 40-year
old fighters, thus, adding to the national prestige. To current military analysts,
the increased lethality represents a force that can potentially skew the entire
regional balance of power. The move from the Chinese Air Force of over 5,000
aircraft to one of 1,617, approximately 500 of which are modern, changes the
range of strategic employment options available to the PRC.
China’s Modern Air Force: Implications in IAF
Incidentally, there is an interesting relationship between the Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd (then Hindustan Aircraft Ltd.) and the Chinese Aviation Industry,
historically. Douglas Pawley, a private American businessman, who had set up
a number of aircraft factories in China in the 1930s was looking to wind them
down due to the advancing Japanese forces invading the country. It was William
D Pawley who, through a chance meeting with Walchand Hirachand, an Indian
businessman, in an airliner, flying from the US, decided to transfer his operations
to India and set up a joint venture by establishing the first aircraft factory in
India in 1939, the Hindustan Aircraft Ltd. (now Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.).8
Comparative analysis based on modern sophisticated Chinese Air Force vis-a-
vis the present-day combat capabilities of IAF need to be revisited to access the
threat scenario in the Asian subcontinent. Based on the fact that Airpower strategy
and the aviation industry have advanced together, insight into what Airpower
strategy, both countries might foresee in future becomes even more relevant.
Thereafter, it peeks into the current status of IAF with focus onto its Indigenous
fighter project “Tejas” as well as the future of India’s fifth generation fighter
projects.
With an analysis of planned inductions as well futuristic production capability
of its aviation industry, comprehensive military power can be calculated with
respect to both the countries. By virtue of SWOT analysis (strength, weakness,
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opportunity, threat), application of Chinese air power against India was analysed
wherein it was assessed that current Chinese air power can be used from air
force bases located in Tibet but still would not pose an unmanageable threat to
the IAF. Indeed, given the inadequacy of secure and hard shelters for its fighters
in Tibet, The PLAAF would presently face serious problems of surviving a
battle against India. However, the advent of the new generation fighters like
Su-30 MKK, J-10, J-11, J-20, air refuelling capabilities, airborne radar and an
improved air defence system will further improve China’s capabilities in the
coming years and will prove to be a threat worth reckoning with.
Analysis with respect to the aspects of quality and quantity of the production
capabilities of the Aviation industries of both, China and India, and India’s role
in the changing geopolitics in the region under preview of current rise of China,
is viewed both in terms of threat as well as an opportunity. While India must
accept the inevitable rise of China as a challenge but, at the same time also
prepare to leverage greater influence on other nations in the region to maintain
the balance of power, which would help India address its security dilemma.
Hence, while both China and India in their own interest must build capabilities,
they must also accept the fact that the future order in Asia will have the capacity
to absorb the aspirations of both the countries concurrently. However, Indian
policy makers must chip-in and provide greater impetus to defence, building
military capabilities not only through imports but also by the process of
indigenization and thus reverse the extremely skewed self-reliance index. If
India wants to elevate its status and leverage greater influence in the evolving
new order in Asia, it would not only require increasing its military capability
but also expanding its self-reliance as well as intellectual capacity that is required
to combat the threat of an emerging regional power.
Changes in the PLAAF doctrine and concepts have had an effect on the
development of an advanced industrial and technological base. China has for
long been trying to develop its indigenous defence industry because of the
realisation that foreign countries will not part with critical technology. To develop
its own industry, China has spent many resources on R&D and on procuring
Western technology illegally, by cyber-attack, espionage and finding loopholes
in western sanctions for dual use technology. As a result of these steps, the
Chinese aviation made good progress in all fields except aero-engines and fire
control radars. These shortcomings are being addressed, and China is reported
to be investing in aero-engine R&D to cover this technological gap.
Conclusion
From the Indian stand-point, the ineptitude on the part of the government to
China’s Rapid Strides in Aviation Industry:  Implications for Indian Air Force
Liberal Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 1, January–June 2018114
capitalise on the knowledge generated by rising industrialization is glaring
evidence. Hence, despite being amongst the top ten defence spenders in the
world, India continues to procure over 70 percent of its equipment needs from
abroad. As a result, India is unable to extract the maximum benefit for its
economic growth. Nevertheless, if India at all wants to reverse this imbalance
and in future compete with China, it would have to bring about innovative and
creative reforms. India will rapidly have to shift focus from acquiring platforms
to developing capabilities, absorb R&D as an integral part of the system by
focussing on components in the denial list and look at R&D from a long-term
perspective as an investment for future growth. The industry will need to
strategize by becoming a part of the global supply chain which will not only
invigorate the aviation industry as a whole but also bring along with it better
management and financial practices, improve efficiency and produce better
quality products for the end user.
India’s reaction to reforms in China’s aviation industry and its progress in
military modernisation is a natural response by any growing superpower. China
is merely exercising its legitimate right to modernise and guarantee its national
security by preparing for asymmetric operations firstly against the ‘state-of-
the-art’ military powers which would automatically prepare China against any
other rising power in the evolving world order, and India too could strategize
for the future. From the Indian perspective, the rise of China’s military must
also be viewed as a driver to spur India’s future military capability and capacities.
China’s rise by default has drawn out a roadmap for India’s military strategy
and modernisation and, hence it is now upto India, to maximise from the
opportunity and narrow the gap in military capabilities between the two countries.
Therefore, China’s rise has to be clearly and closely monitored by India. India,
like China is at an advantage, with its economy expected to grow at 7-8 percent
based on strong fundamentals, robust institutions, vibrant democratic system,
and is largely perceived as an attractive market by investors across the globe.
India needs to be cautious about China’s continuous increase in military budget,
which would widen the gap in its capability and, as a result, create greater
asymmetry between China and India. Therefore, India needs to strategize in the
coming decade, look at its military expenditure as a long-term investment which
will not only invigorate growth in the aviation sector but also, place India in a
position of advantage with the changing geopolitics in the region.
Recommendations
After exhaustive exposure to the various aspects related to Chinese aviation
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industry as well as Indian aviation industry, the following recommendations to
boost the Indian aviation industry can be considered.
(a) Transparency of the work culture of the various government-run R&D
institutes needs to improve. People need to be made accountable for
long delays in rolling out key projects. The ‘blame game’ so inherent to
the government institutes needs to stop immediately and the focus
should shift towards creating a healthy atmosphere in the industry.
Policies of either perform or perish have to be followed to compete in
the open market at a global level.
(b) Departmental procedures and willingness to share information between
the Government organisations like DRDO labs as well as private
partners like L&T, Bharat Forge, etc. need to improve. In case, DRDO
continues to hold essential data required for R&D by private partners,
under the clause of confidentiality, private groups will ultimately choke
and vanish from the Indian Aviation Industry in no time. If required, a
nominal consultancy fee can be charged to the private firm by the
DRDO labs but exchange of essential information for development and
progress of this sector should and must be shared.
(c) Hegemony of PSUs like HAL, BEL needs to be stopped immediately.
On close interaction with different private firms who have finished
developing their products, it is often found that they are still waiting for
certification and field trials. Procedural delay in certification leads to
huge financial losses, which means a lot to the private firms, where
they are accountable to their shareholders and investors. Departmental
hurdles by our ‘White Elephants’ need to be removed for this industry
to survive and have fair a chance in this competition. Such is the level
of juxtapose, that for each and every certification, all private defence
firms have to approach DRDO, who are the nodal agency under MOD.
The rising level of discomfort which has risen in various DRDO labs as
well as PSUs like HAL & BEL, since the entry of private firms into
defence manufacturing is no secret to anybody. Under such conditions,
putting these private partners under indirect approval and a farcical
certification game is akin to pleading non-guilty in front of hungry
Lions. In case the interference of PSUs and DRDO in the acquisition
process is not removed, all the private players will end up losing all
their money to lengthy and tedious evaluation and the certification
game and finally Hegemony of DRDO and PSUs will prevail as it was
before and no progress will be seen in this sector.
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(d) Rules and regulations regarding export of Indigenous defence products
needs to be eased. This will provide a wider customer base to our
private industry, wherein they do not have to totally rely on the Indian
Armed Forces for their orders. At the same time, with better revenues
from their sale abroad, they will be able to consolidate their position in
the global market and hence will project a strong global appeal for
Indian aviation products.
(e) Interaction between R&D, the manufacturer and finally the end user is
the major grey area, right now. It was a glaring fact that R&D done by
research labs has very little sight into the tactical applications of the
project they are working on. User Interface was missing during the
entire process of R&D and even manufacture. This interface has been
the primary stimuli of the growing mistrust between users and the
manufacturing agencies, wherein the user will always have a greater
inclination towards products from a foreign manufacturer than
indigenously manufactured products due to this glaring discrepancy in
indigenous products. Close interaction between the user and the
manufacturer, during the different stages of development will reduce
the flaws and shortcoming which are likely to come out during field
trials and also infuse confidence in the users.
(f) Quality assurance of our indigenous aviation products is an issue,
which keeps troubling our aviation industry perpetually all the time.
The refusal of the French to validate the guarantee on the Indian
manufactured ‘Rafale’ fighter was considered as a major thaw in the
entire deal. We cannot blame the French for this, because we know our
fault lines, which we have not been able to correct in the last almost
five decades. Finally, accountability needs to improve and people
should be held responsible for poor workmanship and quality control,
irrespective of the seniority of their positions or their political
connections. We can no longer lose lives of potential users to faulty
products by our PSUs. These faulty products, apart from costing
precious lives, and thus our prestige also, give a poor name to the
Aviation Industry of our country.
(g) The advent of the new Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) and Defence
Procurement Manual (DPM) 2016, the formal introduction of ‘Make in
India’ and giving a top priority to indigenously “Designed, Developed
& Manufactured” products is a welcome step by the new government.
Defence R&D is a costly affair for any private player. Private firms are
responsible to their shareholders and require influx of regular capital to
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sustain themselves in a highly competitive market. Hence, private
firms are looking for firm orders from the Indian Designed Developed
& Manufactured (IDDM) may sound good on paper, but it is a regular
and assured supply order, which is vital for sustenance. Otherwise,
private defence firms will close down with the same speed in which
they actually opened.
(h) HAL has to grow itself beyond LCA. Upgradation of LCA has to gain
momentum to keep pace with the evolving aviation technology and Air
Force needs. Observations made by its primary users, i.e. IAF need to
be addressed on a priority basis.
(i) Realistic execution towards Indigenous Fighter projects like the AMCA
(Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft) need to be expedited; otherwise,
the project will suffer indefinite delays and eventually turn into a tug of
war between the manufacturer and the User, similar in lines to its
predecessor LCA.
(j) Though recommendations of Committee on Requirement vs. Feasibility
of Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) for IAF are yet to be opened
in public domain, still on hindsight, if India still wants to pursue its
FGFA without Russian Assistance, experienced and proficient man-
power needs to be enrolled on a priority basis, who have the capability
and can roll out projects of that significance. Leaving it purely on HAL
and DRDO will take the project back by at least another 20 years which
is definitely not in favour of INDIA.
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